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FOREWORD
Diane Marie Amann*
“Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine,”
Secretary of State George C. Marshall told an audience at Harvard in
1947, “but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose
should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to
permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free
institutions can exist.”1 With these words he announced a plan – the
Marshall Plan – by which the United States would help to rebuild a
continent ravaged by World War II. Stressing the danger that
Europe’s collapse posed to the U.S. economy, Marshall stated, “It is
logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to
assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without
which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.” He
insisted on a sustained response: “Such assistance, I am convinced,
must not be on a peace-meal basis as various crises develop. Any
assistance that this Government may render in the future should
provide a cure rather than a mere palliative.”
Europe revived. So did Japan, subject of a parallel U.S. reconstruction effort. Post-war prosperity fostered a self-image of the United States as a nation-builder, as a positive force for democracy throughout the globe. The image persisted, reinforced by U.S. interventions in
countries like Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In March 2003, it helped
propel the United States to forge a coalition of countries willing –
notwithstanding the absence of U.N. Security Council sanction – to use
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law; Visiting
Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law.
1 Text of the Marshall Plan Speech, State Department handout version of 4 June
1947, reprinted in GEORGE C. MARSHALL FOUNDATION, THE MARSHALL PLAN,
http://www.marshallfoundation.org/marshall_plan_speech_harvard.html (last visited
Nov. 23, 2004). All quotes in this paragraph are from this speech, and are reprinted
using spelling as in the original.
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military force to topple the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein in
Iraq. But more than a year and a half after the invasion, it was difficult
to see anything approaching revival. Iraq remained plagued by suicide
car-bombings, insurgent rebellions, and hostage beheadings. Deaths
among coalition troops – mostly Americans – well exceeded a thousand.2 Deaths of Iraqi civilians were estimated at ten, even a staggering
one hundred, times that number.3 Nearly all international humanitarian aid organizations had left the country, a number after their own
workers were kidnapped and killed. Insecurity stymied efforts to
rebuild the country’s infrastructure and fueled political infighting in a
country long divided along ethnoreligious lines. The aftermath of
Hussein’s ouster thus sorely tested America’s self-image as a builder of
free and democratic nations.
In truth, even before the Iraq invasion, events elsewhere had
exposed as myth the notion that one country’s one program could
transform another country. Few reconstruction efforts launched in the
last half of the twentieth century approached the success of the midcentury Marshall Plan. Study of those later efforts has begun to give
rise to a body of literature most instructive on the matter of reconstruction.4 One lesson stands out: no single program is sufficient.
Emphasis on any one goal – prosecuting and punishing individuals
deemed most responsible for war and its incident crimes, say, or
crushing insurgency in one city when other cities remain insecure – is
unlikely to bring about lasting change in a war-torn society. A host of
2 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://icasualties.org/oif/ (stating that military
fatalities totaled 1,373 persons, 1,227 of them Americans) (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
3 Compare Les Roberts et al., Mortality before and after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq:
cluster sample survey, LANCET, Oct. 29, 2004, http://image.thelancet.com/extras/04art10
342web.pdf (comparing deaths before and after invasion, concludes that nearly 100,000
civilians, mostly women and children, died in the post-invasion period than would have
if no invasion had occurred), with Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.net
(placing number of “[c]ivilians reported killed by military intervention in Iraq” between
14,505 and 16,662) (last visited Nov. 23, 2004). The security crisis received extensive
treatment in CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
PROJECT, PROGRESS OR PERIL? MEASURING IRAQ’S RECONSTRUCTION vii-ix, 18-30
(Frederick Barton & Bathsheba Crocker dirs., Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0409_progressperil.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2004).
4 The literature is far too rich to include in a single footnote. For a very small
sampling, in addition to the sources cited elsewhere in this foreword, see PAUL
COLLIER ET AL., BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL WAR AND DEVELOPMENT
POLICY (2003); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); MARTHA MINOW,
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1998); NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA,
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1995);
Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002).
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projects must be undertaken, rather, and often all at once. In a given
country the reconstruction mission’s immediate tasks may include,
therefore: making the country secure for its citizens and all others;
replacing localized despotism with a national and democratic government; soothing the trauma and dispelling the hatred fomented by internecine warfare; fostering a legitimate economy; and building roads,
schools, and other infrastructure. The mission itself may need examination; that is, events, like those in Iraq, may reveal a need for rethinking the international legal precepts that underlie war and its aftermath.
In short, nation-building requires a multifaceted approach, one that
takes into account all the small victories, and defeats, of prior missions.
This theme of multifaceted rebuilding provided the foundation for
the March 12, 2004 symposium of the UC Davis Journal of International Law & Policy. Entitled “Rethinking Reconstruction After Iraq,”
the symposium was designated a regional meeting of the American
Society of International Law and the American Branch of the International Law Association, and further was sponsored by the American
National Section of the International Association of Penal Law and the
International Human Rights Committee of the Bar Association of San
Francisco.
At times during the symposium, panelists joined the heated debate
regarding jus ad bellum – the law of going to war – that has surrounded
the decision to invade Iraq. But discussion centered on matters more
pressing in the post-Hussein era: jus in bello, the law of conducting war
or occupation, as well as laws and policies relating to vindication of
victims, punishment of wrongdoers, and establishment of a vibrant,
stable, and democratic society. In keeping with the theme of learning
from past missions, presentations ventured far beyond Baghdad to
highlight lessons from efforts in the Balkans, West Africa, Afghanistan, and Latin America.
Speaking on the first panel, “Peace & Security,” which this author
moderated, were: Professor David D. Caron, C. William Maxeiner
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley,
School of Law, and a member of the U.N. Compensation Commission,
set up to handle claims arising out of the first Gulf War; Tamara
Darweesh, Esq., an Iraqi-American and University of California,
Davis, alumna, who participated in the U.S. Justice Department’s first
mission to Iraq; and James C. O’Brien, Esq., a principal in The
Albright Group LLC, Washington, D.C., and a presidential envoy for
the Balkans during the Clinton Administration. Following them, on a
“Liberty & Justice” panel moderated by Professor Cruz Reynoso,
Boochever & Bird Professor of Law, University of California, Davis,
School of Law, and Vice Chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
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were: Professor Karima Bennoune, Rutgers University School of LawNewark, and a former legal adviser for Amnesty International;
Professor Bartram S. Brown, Chicago-Kent College of Law, and
Visiting Fellow at the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International
Law, University of Cambridge, England; Barry Portman, Esq., Federal
Public Defender, San Francisco, and another member of the Justice
Department’s first mission to Iraq; and Professor John Yoo, University
of California, Berkeley, School of Law, who had served as a Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel. A third panel, “Economy & Society,” was moderated
by Professor Andrea K. Bjorklund, University of California, Davis,
School of Law, former Attorney-Adviser, U.S. State Department, and
former Senior Counsel, U.S. Trade Commission. Panelists were: Carl
B. Kress, Esq., Chief of Staff and Senior Adviser to the Director of the
U.S. Trade and Development Agency; Professor Naomi Roht-Arriaza,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law; and Professor
William A. Schabas, Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights,
National University of Ireland Galway, and a member of the Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. At day’s end, in a
session entitled “Rhetoric & Ethics,” moderated by Professor Beth
Van Schaack, Santa Clara University School of Law, panelists and
audience members discussed ethical issues involved in engaging in, or
refraining from, reconstruction, transitional justice, and transplantation of the rule of law. The articles in this volume exemplify the
breadth and depth of discussion, and promise to be valuable contributions to the growing literature on post-conflict reconstruction.
Yoo’s article focuses on the period after invasion – in the case of
Iraq, after Hussein was deposed. Yoo posits “the authority of the United States, under domestic and international law, to make fundamental
changes to the constitutional law and government institutions of
Iraq.”5 Such changes indeed were signal accomplishments of the Coalition Provisional Authority that ruled, advised by an Iraqi Governing
Council that it had appointed. As the article foreshadows, this phase
saw promulgation of a new constitution and of a statute establishing a
special court for trial of Hussein and other captured leaders of the
former regime.6
Sovereignty was transferred on June 28, 2004, to a provisional

5 John Yoo, Iraqi Reconstruction and the Law of Occupation, 11 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 7 (2004).
6 Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, Mar. 8,
2004, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html; Statute of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal, Dec. 10, 2003, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm.
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Iraqi government. Brown concentrates on this next phase.7 The writings of nineteenth century British theorist John Stuart Mill bolster
Brown’s arguments that a state should not intervene lightly in
another’s internal affairs and that, if it chooses to intervene, the state
must commit itself to long-term reconstruction of the invaded state.
That task, Brown warns, may last far longer than the invading state’s
political will either to wage war or to rebuild. This consideration leads
him to favor the United Nations as a vehicle for a multilateral
reconstruction effort.
The United States directed early reconstruction efforts in postinvasion Iraq, and Kress’ article provides a most useful guide to the
alphabet soup of the federal agencies involved.8 As he demonstrates, a
host of agencies – among them, the Departments of State, Commerce,
and Defense, as well as the Agency for International Development and
the Trade and Development Agency – may play a role in post-conflict
reconstruction.
O’Brien notes that international post-conflict missions, like the
one in Iraq, risk failure if they are ill-prepared to fight the local elites
who try to seize power over some or all of a society as it emerges from
war, whom he calls warlords.9 Warlords have arisen in places as varied
as Serbia, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan. O’Brien advances a threepart formula to rein in the warlords: lawyers, guns, and money.
Without guns – security enforced by personnel empowered to stop
looters and disperse mobs – reconstruction simply cannot happen.
Lawyers, in tandem with policymakers, must work to ensure respect
for the human rights of the local population and to pursue the path to
justice most appropriate in the situation at hand. Money too is
important: the flow of money that feeds warlords must be stanched,
even as money for reconstruction is used to expand opportunity and
thus to wean followers from dependence on warlords’ largess.
Money is the principal subject of David Caron’s article, which
sounds a note of fiscal caution about reconstruction in Iraq.10 Before
the invasion, U.S. officials had predicted that Iraq, with its huge
reserves of oil, rapidly would be able to pay for its own reconstruction.
7 Bartram S. Brown, Intervention, Self-Determination, Democracy and the Residual
Responsibilities of the Occupying Power in Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 23
(2004).
8 Carl B. Kress, The United States Government and Post-Conflict Economic
Reconstruction, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 75 (2004).
9 James C. O’Brien, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Warlords and Reconstruction
After Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 99 (2004).
10 David D. Caron, The Reconstruction of Iraq: Dealing with Debt, 11 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 123 (2004).
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By late 2004, that had not come to pass. Caron’s article cites Iraq’s
immense debt as a principal cause of this failure. That debt began
during Hussein’s costly war against Iran, and mushroomed as a result
of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and the U.N. sanctions regime that
followed. The challenge of developing a plan for repayment that does
not stifle reconstruction is, in a word, immense.
Schabas concentrates on yet another formidable challenge: how to
balance the desire to call to account the criminals of the just-concluded
war with the need to heal the war-torn society.11 His article presents as
a case in point Sierra Leone, where both a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and a Special Court have struggled to achieve that balance in the wake of a decade-long civil war. The Special Court discredited amnesties that had been granted, as would many in the human
rights community. Schabas criticizes that view. Quoting from the commission report he helped prepare, he tells the uncomfortable truth
that eliminating the possibility of amnesty may prolong war and
prevent peace.
Bennoune’s article criticizes human rights organizations for accepting international humanitarian law as the corpus that governs the
conduct of war.12 That choice, she maintains, gives short shrift to fundamental principles of international human rights law. Among these
are the rights of combatants and noncombatants alike to life and to
protection against undue physical or psychological injury. Bennoune
calls for evaluation of military conflict in light of human rights rather
than humanitarian law, an approach that would result in stricter
scrutiny both of the conduct of war and also of the choice to go to war.
As it turned out, the Marshall Plan and its counterpart in Japan
constituted a bookend for discussion; the other bookend was, of
course, the ongoing situation in Iraq. U.S. efforts after World War II
were shown to be aberrations rather than easy-to-repeat models.13
Discussion made clear that much yet may be learned from trial and
error. The articles in this issue will aid study of a multifaceted
approach, for they provide cogent analyses of efforts at economic,
political and legal reconstruction in Sierra Leone, the Balkans, East
Timor, Afghanistan, and, of course, Iraq.
11 William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
145 (2004).
12 Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq
2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 171 (2004).
13 See, e.g., JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., AMERICA’S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING:
FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ (2003) (“The cases of Germany and Japan set a standard for
postconflict nation-building that has not since been matched.”).

